Tuesday, September 8, 2015
SECTION 90: CORRUPT PRACTICES & HOW THEY APPLY TO WOOLWICH TOWNSHIP
Yesterday I detailed Sections 89, 90 & 91 of the Municipal Elections Act (MEA) and promised that today we would look at our cases here in Woolwich Township. Firstly a surprise; there are four cases requiring our immediate attention, not three. Secondly our three elected councillors have also dragged in others covered by the Enforcement sections of the MEA. Section 90.(6) of the MEA states: " A clerk or other election official who wilfully fails to perform a duty imposed by this Act is guilty of an offence that constitutes a corrupt practice." Yes I believe that the reference to a "clerk" is a direct reference to the Municipal Clerk all municipalities are required to have. The "others" who have been dragged in may be clearer after reading Section 94.1 (2) which states: " A corporation or trade union that is convicted of an offence under this Act is liable to a fine of not more than $50,000 in addition to any other penalty provided for in this Act.". I am a little confused with this section. These "other" penalties include jail time and hence I wonder how one puts a corporation into jail. Does this suggest that the owner or major shareholder could be held personally liable for a corporate misdeed?
Section 90. (6) dealing with the Municipal Clerk has the this title preceding it: "Neglect of Duty". That pretty well sums it up. The Municipal Clerk does NOT owe her first duty to the municipality, the council or her superviser presumably the CAO of the municipality. Her first and foremost duty is to the citizens of both the community and the province. Her duties as well are to abide by all the relevant legislation including the MEA. That this is a difficult position if not an outright conflict of interest when one is hired by the municipal staff (CAO) and paid by the municipality I can appreciate.
That said our Clerk failed to issue the mandatory thirty day notice for submission of Financial Statements to all candidates ie. Mark Bauman and she failed to issue the Notices of Breech to both Mark Bauman and Sandy Shantz. Finally again she failed to issue the required Forfeiture of position to Mayor Shantz in a timely fashion. The issue here may hinge on the wilful aspect of her failings.
Councillor Mark Bauman had been through four previous elections and claims that the only time he properly submitted a Financial Statement was the one occasion where he had an opponent. That's really not much of a defence. The issue is whether he is as stupid and lazy as he would have us believe. It turns out that despite Mark's and the Clerk's protestations to the contrary, in fact there are multiple documents clearly stating that Acclaimed candidates must file Financial Statements. These include the MEA, the 2010 and 2014 Candidates Guide and the Financial Statement itself. If Mark fudged the truth is he guilty of a corrupt practice? Did he furnish " false or misleading information to a person whom this Act authorizes to obtain information" ? It is my strong opinion that he provided false and misleading information to Superior Court. One question I have is whether or not Superior Court are a "...person to whom this Act authorizes to obtain information". Another question I have is whether I as the complainant am a "...person to whom this Act authorizes to obtain information". These may be very tricky definitions.
Councillor Scott Hahn has not had the charmed relationship with MECAC (Compliance Audit Committee) that Mayor Shantz had.
MECAC properly ordered a Compliance Audit which quite frankly was devastating. His last minute receipts and invoices had a huge odour to them and the fact that the forensic Auditor (Froese & Partners) could not remorely validate any of them from the corporate end of either his father's company or his in-laws was very damaging. The fact the receipts for alleged illegal cash payments also could not be validated via a forensic audit was also very damaging. The validation I am referring to is of course documentary validation. Scott's chances before the courts I view as being very, very scary. MECAC baled him out by refusing to send him on to those courts. My opinion is that he and family members pulled a very stupid stunt to get him off and in an even half honest world he and they would currently be in legal jeopardy.
Lastly we have Mayor Shantz. Is she gulity of "Corrupt practices" as defined by the MEA. Let's figure that one out tomorrow.
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Yes there is evidence on the record against Bauman and Hahn and Shantz and the other Shantz that these individuals and in the Shantz and Hahn cases family members have also been implicated as being complicit personally so certainly subsection (m) of Section 89 of MEA would apply and also subsection (h) and I did not read anything that would indicate that both Corporate and personal penalties could be applied.
ReplyDeleteThe evidence shows that they are all guilty along with the Clerk, and even though the ACT clearly indicates the penalties, the Clerk and MECAC and the Court (and the Police it looks like) failed to act on behalf of the taxpayers and citizens. What a farce!. The real insult to the taxpayer is of course when the ACT is quite clear but then leaves the door open for an application to the court where "they" literally make shit up as they go! and then call it the law.
OFFENCES Section 89 of the MEA
(h) furnishes false or misleading information to a person whom this Act authorizes to obtain information;
(m) attempts to do something described in clauses (a) to (l). 1996, c. 32, Sched., s. 89; 2009, c. 33, Sched. 21, s. 8 (55).
The system does NOT work for the average taxpayer or citizen...In a modern democracy like ours for one to become elected means that that they technically have so many conflicts of interest at the point of becoming elected that they cannot even govern themselves, let alone anyone else because if they were honest and true they would have to declare a conflict of interest at literally every issue that comes before them. This is the very truth at issue in our local politics. Nowadays it is very true that people without conflicts of interest cannot get elected. In addition IF these conflicts were disclosed the very people that get elected and appointed would be unable to govern on behalf of all the taxpayers/citizens.
Mr. Marshall, when are you going to be part of the solution and not continue to make more problems on technicalities? Every time you study the policies and procedures you cost the township more money. Your agenda has clearly changed. You started CPAC to make a difference for the benefit of the community. Your new agenda is not helping our community. Let TAG do their thing and hopefully they can have the success that CPAC were unable to achieve. I do believe you want what is best for the community. I do. I just think you need to take a step back and do what is best for the community.
ReplyDeleteI did not start CPAC. They began as UPAC (Uniroyal Public Advisory Committee) approx. in 1991. The new CPAC (9 days old) also was not started by me. TAG & RAC will only "achieve" exactly what Chemtura/M.O.E. want them to achieve.
ReplyDeleteHere is a true quote out of one of our textbooks and just so happens to be TRUE!
ReplyDeleteFor public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with a high-stakes interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies in attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether.[1] Regulatory capture refers to the actions by interest groups when this imbalance of focused resources devoted to a particular policy outcome is successful at "capturing" influence with the staff or commission members of the regulatory agency, so that the preferred policy outcomes of the special interest groups are implemented.
Regulatory capture theory is a core focus of the branch of public choice referred to as the economics of regulation; economists in this specialty are critical of conceptualizations of governmental regulatory intervention as being motivated to protect public good. Often cited articles include Bernstein (1955), Huntington (1952), Laffont & Tirole (1991), and Levine & Forrence (1990). The theory of regulatory capture is associated with Nobel laureate economist George Stigler,[2] one of its main developers.[3]
Likelihood of regulatory capture is a risk to which an agency is exposed by its very nature.[4] This suggests that a regulatory agency should be protected from outside influence as much as possible. Alternatively, it may be better to not create a given agency at all lest the agency become victim, in which case it may serve its regulated subjects rather than those whom the agency was designed to protect. A captured regulatory agency is often worse than no regulation, because it wields the authority of government. However, increased transparency of the agency may mitigate the effects of capture. Recent evidence suggests that, even in mature democracies with high levels of transparency and media freedom, more extensive and complex regulatory environments are associated with higher levels of corruption (including regulatory capture).[5]